Tag: businesses

Covid, Force Majeure, and Frustration of Purpose – Some Words of Caution

Courts generally show a pattern of skepticism toward force majeure and frustration of purpose arguments stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic. Here’s what businesses need to know to protect themselves.

Definitions

First, we need to get our terminology straight. Frustration of purpose and force majeure, while related concepts, are distinct in some important ways. Force Majeure is an event mentioned explicitly in a contract that discharges the parties of at least some of their responsibilities. Frustration of purpose, on the other hand, is a contract defense alleging that the basic purpose of the contract being litigated has been frustrated by an event not reasonably foreseeable to the parties. Michigan Courts use a three-part test to assess frustration of purpose: 1) the contract must be at least partially executory; (2) the frustrated party’s purpose in making the contract must have been known to both parties when the contract was made; (3) this purpose must have been basically frustrated by an event not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made, the occurrence of which has not been due to the fault of the frustrated party and the risk of which was not assumed by him. Molnar v. Molnar, 110 Mich. App. 622, 313 N.W.2d 171 (1981).

Primary issues: Causation and Foreseeability.

It’s hard to deny that the COVID-19 pandemic involved possibly the most significant disruption of global commerce since World War II. As of this writing, the WHO reports over six million lives have been lost to COVID-19. Sweeping restrictions on travel and trade across the globe have also come at an enormous and self-evident economic cost. So—why isn’t COVID persuasive as a force majeure or frustration of purpose event?

One issue is causation. It can be challenging to prove that the pandemic caused a disruption when intervening factors like government action come into play.

For example, Michigan saw strict government shutdown mandates related to COVID. Though these shutdowns may have saved numerous lives, they inarguably caused some markets to collapse overnight. Suddenly, college towns were empty; theaters, bowling alleys, and dine-in restaurants were shuttered. Did the pandemic cause this? Or did government action cause it? Alternatively, did a business decline for an entirely different reason? Was it already doomed, with a shutdown being only the final nail in the coffin? The same issue comes up with Covid-related supply chain disruptions. Did the pandemic cause it? Labor shortages and strikes? Both?

In a contract case where the defendant suffered a loss of business amid the COVID pandemic, causation issues might render their force majeure or frustration of purpose defenses ineffective. Whether initiating or defending a lawsuit, a party making a frustration of purpose or force majeure argument has a burden of proof to meet.

Another problem is that COVID-19 and its effects have arguably been foreseeable, negating frustration of purpose and force majeure arguments.

Erin Webb, a legal analyst writing for Bloomberg, noted in a November 2021 article titled ANALYSIS: No Longer Unforeseeable? Force Majeure and Covid-19 that courts have rejected Covid-related force majeure and frustration of purpose arguments on the reasoning that the pandemic and its effects were foreseeable.

“Since early 2021, with Covid-19 the new normal and the coronavirus feeling a lot less’ novel,’ courts have increasingly expected parties to have adjusted to pandemic-related issues—from supply chain disruptions to the challenges of remote work. So, for those still wishing to explore such defenses, careful factual research and analysis early in a case will be more important than ever,” writes Webb.

In short, with the pandemic being in its third year, disruptions related to the pandemic are no longer unforeseeable.

Another older version of this reasoning is that a decline in business, even if resulting from conditions such as a pandemic and stay-at-home order, is an inherent risk of doing business that the parties assume. “The tenant is not relieved from the obligation to pay rent if there is a serviceable use still available consistent with the use provision in the lease. The fact that the use is less valuable or less profitable or even unprofitable does not mean the tenant’s use has been substantially frustrated.” Mel Frank Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Di-Chem Co., 580 N.W.2d 802, 808 (Iowa 1998)

For a frustration of purpose argument to succeed, the entire basic purpose of the contract must be frustrated. This has happened in some cases. See, for example, Bay City Realty, LLC v. Mattress Firm, Inc., No. 20-CV-11498, 2021 WL 1295261 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2021). The case involved a frustration of purpose defense to the landlord’s breach of contract claim. The court found in favor of the tenant/defendant on the frustration of purpose issue, holding that the Governor’s order shuttering non-essential businesses frustrated the primary purpose of the Lease (retail sales of mattresses).

Force majeure clauses—should we use them for pandemics?

Paula M. Bagger, writing for the American Bar Association, covers this topic in greater detail in a March 2021 article titled The Importance of Force Majeure Clauses in the COVID-19 Era. Bagger warns that “we must not ignore the potential applicability of force majeure to our commercial agreements.”

Possible solutions are not as simple as slapping the word “pandemics” into a force majeure clause. For one, some courts may reason that the parties actually foresaw listed events, even though such reasoning goes somewhat against the logic of a force majeure clause, which lists potential unforeseen events.

Writes Erin Webb: “Some courts have found that the parties’ ability to name a risk—like a pandemic or a government shutdown risk—in a force majeure clause means that the risk was not only foreseeable at the time of contracting, but actually foreseen, defeating other defenses to nonperformance, such as impossibility of performance or frustration of purpose.”

This reasoning may be particularly applicable to Covid-19, given evidence that Covid-19 will be endemic to the human population in the future. If we expect Covid, we can no longer expect to use it as an excuse.

Furthermore, going back to causation, a force majeure clause mentioning a pandemic may not adequately address the issues accompanying the COVID-19 pandemic. More open-ended catch-all-type statements may be better.

However, it is essential to consider one’s own goals when drafting a force majeure clause. For example, if you’re a commercial landlord, you may not want a force majeure clause to encompass pandemics like COVID-19 – it could give a delinquent tenant ammunition in its efforts not to pay you. Conversely, if you’re a commercial tenant, you might want an out if business dries up.

Conclusion

COVID-related frustration of purpose and force majeure are not cure-alls, and courts will not take these arguments at face value. However, with the right facts, frustration of purpose or force majeure arguments can be successful. Businesses should take positive steps to ensure that their interests are protected if/when COVID comes knocking again. For all your business needs regarding frustration of purpose and force majeure clauses, the attorneys at Fraser Trebilcock can help.

Matthew J. Meyerhuber is an attorney at Fraser Trebilcock focusing on general litigation, cannabis law, environmental law, and real estate. Matthew can be reached at mmeyerhuber@fraserlawfirm.com or 517.377.0885. 

Recent Amendments Place Creditors in a Stronger Position to Defend Against Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Preference Lawsuits

As the bankruptcy wave continues to build, more businesses are being forced to deal with bankrupt customers. What’s worse—and which often comes as a big surprise—is when a business gets sued by the debtor or bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover payments made by the debtor before the bankruptcy. Such lawsuits, which attempt to recover “preferential payments,” cost businesses time, require the expenditure of legal fees, and often result in the business paying a settlement amount to make the matter go away.

With more companies filing for bankruptcy, the likelihood that businesses will face preference lawsuits is growing. Fortunately, the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with certain defenses they can use to ward off a preference lawsuit, and Congress recently took action that strengthens those defenses. The “Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019” (SBRA), which went into effect in February, 2020, contains amendments to Chapter 11 bankruptcy preference law that are not limited to small business reorganizations.

What is a Preference Lawsuit?

Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor or bankruptcy trustee, subject to certain defenses, to recover payments made to creditors within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The look-back period for payments is increased to one year for “insiders.” The policy behind preference actions is that they prevent aggressive collection action against a debtor that might force a debtor into bankruptcy, and they also help ensure equal treatment of creditor claims.

For example, if one creditor receives payment on a debt in the days leading up to a bankruptcy filing due to aggressive collection action, but another similarly situated creditor doesn’t receive payment because it did not engage in collection action, then the latter would only be left with a claim in the bankruptcy. The preference provisions allow the pre-petition payments made to the aggressive creditor to be clawed back, allowing each creditor’s claim to receive equal treatment in the bankruptcy. That’s how the system is supposed to work.

In reality, all kinds of creditors, including those who have valid defenses to preference claims, typically get sued regardless of their defenses. Prior to the recent amendments, the Bankruptcy Code did not explicitly require debtors to conduct any due diligence as to defenses prior to filing a preference lawsuit. Historically, debtors simply sued all creditors who received payments within the 90-day period before the bankruptcy, and creditors were left to deal with such lawsuits, often filed in far-flung jurisdictions, on a one-off basis. The recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code’s preference provisions address these issues.

Amendments to Preference Provisions

The SBRA created a new “subchapter V” to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides small business debtors an easier path through bankruptcy. Less discussed is the fact that the SBRA contained two amendments to preference laws that strengthen defenses against preference lawsuits in all Chapter 11 cases.

Prior to the amendments, debtors had to meet a low bar to file a preference lawsuit. It was relatively easy for debtors to meet their burden of proof, and once they did the burden shifted to creditors to establish defenses. The SBRA places an additional hurdle in front of debtors. Now, a debtor or trustee must consider a creditor’s statutory defenses before filing a lawsuit “based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case and taking into account a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses….” Previously, the Bankruptcy Code stated that a debtor or trust “may” do so.

Accordingly, there is now an affirmative obligation that a debtor or trustee investigate whether a creditor has a “subsequent new value”, “ordinary course of business” or other defense before moving forward with a preference action. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of a case and/or an assertion of bad faith filing. Of course, one of the questions that will be sorted out over time in the courts is what constitutes “reasonable due diligence.”

Another welcome change for creditors included in the SBRA relates to the venue in which preference cases may be brought. Prior to the recent changes, the Bankruptcy Code provided that preference claims under $13,650 were to be brought in the district where the defendant resides, rather than where the bankruptcy case was pending. The SBRA raises this threshold amount to $25,000. This change will have a big impact, because it lessens the likelihood of preference claims of less than $25,000 being filed at all, given the costs associated with bringing an action in a distant jurisdiction.

In sum, the SBRA is good news for preference defendants. In fact, many creditors who would have otherwise been sued prior to the amendments will never become a “defendant” in the first place, given the additional obstacles debtors and trustees must overcome.

This alert serves as a general summary, and does not constitute legal guidance. Please contact us with any specific questions.

We have created a response team to the rapidly changing COVID-19 situation and the law and guidance that follows, so we will continue to post any new developments. You can view our COVID-19 Response Page and additional resources by following the link here. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact your Fraser Trebilcock attorney.

Jonathan T. Walton, Jr.’s legal practice focuses on cases arising from commercial transactions, the Uniform Commercial Code, the federal and state securities laws, banking laws and bankruptcy litigation. In the areas of banking, commercial, construction and real estate litigation, he represents lenders, contractors and owners on construction-related claims, and lenders and borrowers in commercial and residential foreclosure matters, large loan defaults and collections, lien priority disputes, and title insurance company liability. He can be reached at (313) 965-9038 or jwalton@fraserlawfirm.com.

Employer Update: Michigan’s NEW Mask Rule – Does it Affect My Business?

On Friday July 10, Governor Whitmer tightened prior rules for wearing of masks, or “face covers.” In summary, the Order requires customers who enter any “indoor public space” of a business to wear a mask, and obligates all businesses that make such “indoor public space” available to require their customers to wear masks. However, the key term, “indoor public space” is not defined in the Order or prior orders. Previously announced minor exceptions for mask use, such as removing coverings while seated in a restaurant, or exempting persons who cannot medically tolerate wearing a mask, are continued. EO 2020-147 applies state-wide, including Regions 6 and 8, the Traverse City area and the Upper Peninsula.

The Provisions of the Executive Order

Section 1 of EO 2020-147 applies to all persons moving in public – outside of their home or residence — within Michigan. The rule states:

“1. Any individual who leaves their home or place of residence must wear a face covering over their nose and mouth:

a. When in any indoor public space.

b. When outdoors and unable to consistently maintain a distance of six feet or more from individuals who are not members of their household; and

c. When waiting for or riding on public transportation, while in a taxi or ridesharing vehicle, or when using a private car service as a means of hired transportation.”

Section 2 of 2020-147 establishes health, age, and business service exceptions to the rule set out in Section 1.

Section 3 of 2020-147 applies to every business in Michigan that is “open to the public,” and makes those businesses responsible to require mask use by visiting customers. Section 3 provides:

“3. To protect workers, shoppers, and the community, no business that is open to the public may provide service to a customer or allow a customer to enter its premises, unless the customer is wearing a face covering as required by this order.”

Interpretation and Application

As noted, the phrase “indoor public space” used in Section 1 does not appear to be defined. However, the Governor has spoken repeatedly and publicly about requiring mask use in retail and, especially, food establishment and bar settings. Also, Section 3 references “shoppers” and another provision of Section 3, not quoted in this Article, refers to liquor licensees. Considering the entire Order in the context of its issuance, it appears that EO 2020-147 is intended to apply to situations where public presence within the “indoor … premises” of the business is routine or, at least, reasonably anticipated.      

Further, Executive Order 147 does not lessen any preexisting face covering requirements, for example, industry-specific rules for non-public operations involving manufacturing or, apparently, office work where no general public access is permitted for the purpose of operating the business.

Examples of businesses that must require mask use by customers present to receive otherwise permissible services include:

  • Food service establishments (currently limited by EO 2020-143 to those earning 30% or less of their gross receipts from alcoholic beverages);
  • Grocery, clothing, retail and other stores or similar establishments, including shopping mall common areas;
  • Publicly used common areas of otherwise private buildings, for example, commercial or apartment building lobbies, restroom areas; and,
  • Public or not-for-profit facilities.

Examples of businesses likely are responsible to require mask use include:

  • Offices or areas of offices where members of the public are present, for example, reception or conference rooms made available to customers in the course of the ordinary business of the enterprise.
  • Waiting rooms (health care facilities are subject to specific rules).

You can read the entire Executive Order here.

This alert serves as a general summary, and does not constitute legal guidance. All statements made in this article should be verified by counsel retained specifically for that purpose. Please contact us with any specific questions.

We have created a response team to the rapidly changing COVID-19 situation and the law and guidance that follows, so we will continue to post any new developments. You can view our COVID-19 Response Page and additional resources by following the link here. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact your Fraser Trebilcock attorney.

Fraser Trebilcock Shareholder Dave Houston has over 40 years of experience representing employers in planning, counseling, and litigating virtually all employment claims and disputes including labor relations (NLRB and MERC), wage and overtime, and employment discrimination, and negotiation of union contracts. He has authored numerous publications regarding employment issues. You can reach him at 517.377.0855 or dhouston@fraserlawfirm.com.